Abstract This essay presents a theory of the State as derived from the writings of Coase, Stigler, and Smith. It argues that the state may find a role in (1) lowering the level of transactions costs; and (2) redistributing property rights given the level of non-zero transactions costs. These tenets suggest an explanation for the secular growth of government. Also, alternative to the Marshallian theory of differing marginal utilities of a dollar of income, the essay offers a more general theory of redistribution in a way consistent with Coase's (1992) concept of a transactionscost-based, more general, price theory.
Ronald H. Coase won the Nobel Prize in 1991 primarily because of the following simple notion that he put forth in``The problem of social cost'' (Coase, 1988) . If the transactions of exchanging property rights are zero, then efficient allocations will occur regardless of the initial distribution of property rights. As liability is a dimension of property rights, a corollary implies that the initial distribution of liability likewise has no deterrent effect on allocating resources efficiently. With positive transactions cost, the``Coase theorem'' says that the initial distribution of property rights including liability can affect the allocation of resources. This implies that some re-distributor, such as the government may be able to achieve a more efficient allocation of resources by reassigning property rights or liability.
The Coase theorem presents two fundamental efficiency roles that the state, or governing corporate body, may fulfil:
(1) lowering the level of transactions costs, such as through the establishment of a system of socio-economic contract law or a set of social mores under which the economic exchange may take place more easily; and (2) redistributing property rights given the level of non-zero transactions costs.
Adam Smith and George Stigler each serve in two ways to help flesh out the above role of the state as derived from Coase. The first precept, that of a state lowering transactions costs so as to facilitate greater exchange, finds some discussion in Smith's (1976 Smith's ( , 1978 Smith's ( , 1982 work. However, rather than the Wealth of Nations or even his other famous work The Theory of Moral Sentiments, it is his Lectures of Jurisprudence that weighs in most on the role in lowering transactions costs. In broad brush, Smith's trilogy of man lends itself easily to equilibrium theory. The economic treatise details the equilibrium of market exchange amongst economic agents given the constraints of law and social norms, and through which prices are determined. The moral treatise details the equilibrium of non-market exchange amongst social groups given the nature of the industrial economy and its laws, and through which social norms are set. The jurisprudence treatise analyses the equilibrium distribution of property rights given the social norms and economic realities, and through which laws are given. Smith's execution of the legal equilibrium falls squarely on the government. Codifying laws so as to capture the spirit of the culture's social and economic interchange, as an extension of Smith, makes the social and economic institutions more efficient because the codification lowers the transactions costs of exchanging within these explicit-price and shadow markets. More broadly, a positive role of the government can arise by supplying public-good types of human and physical capital, as well as by offering or regulating aggregate social insurance against unemployment, retirement, disability, sickness, and bank panics, because such provisions may efficiently decrease the costs of exchange within the market system. The first type of investment policies provide for the``deterministic'' dimension of society, while the second type of insurance policies provide for the``stochastic'' dimension of society. The domestic legislative-judicial system, and the international defense investment, each contain elements of both the deterministic and stochastic lowering of transactions costs. As a subpart of the legal system, the international banks also cross boundaries of investment and insurance devices. And all to be financed optimally in Ramsey fashion.
The other role of the government that Coasian logic implies gets at an economic interpretation of equity. Extreme poverty, for example, that can be ameliorated but is left alone, may not be acceptable to social norms. Out of sync with the desired social equilibrium, the economic system might be expected to engage in less exchange because of the associated social unrest, for example as in riot-blighted areas or because of sanctions against South Africa that cut off the trade door to a whole continent. Given the transactions costs of exchange, a redistribution of property rights, that brings distribution of the economic system in line with social norms, would imply by Coasian logic that more exchange would take place, such as through the ending of sanctions coinciding with the end of Apartheid, the distribution of equity voting rights to all citizens in South Africa, and the incorporation of more Africans into the market system.
George Stigler (1975) makes clear how the redistribution of property rights through economic regulation could simply bestow monopoly rights to the regulated industry. In doing this Stigler shows how the``public interest'' gets served through agents of the``private interests'' so that in the end it is the private interests that benefit. In contrast, a Coasian redistribution of property rights, in the face of given transactions costs and which free up economic exchange, and if also unthwarted by private interests, still stands as a way to increase the gains from trade. For example, Henry George (1926)-type property taxes that finance G.B. Shaw (1944)-type public education gives less advantaged children access to the Coasian drinking hole of society; more market exchange results. Even though the use of school-grounds may be worth more to the children when for quality education than to the neighboring home International Journal of Social Economics 26,5 592 owners when alternatively for a drug market, a playground, or a park, the costs to the children or their parents of forming an effective coalition that can bargain with an effective coalition of property owners, plus the cost of forming an effective coalition of property owners, remain so high as to prohibit most such private exchanges from taking place. With such a public initiated exchange of property rights. The government is forcing the exchange by giving the property owners higher community education in exchange for their property taxes. Put differently, the social cost-benefit analysis may place the value of the capital to the property owners at less than the value of the education to society. This type of transfer, only feasible because of the social norms that accept the legal contract of individuals to the rule of the democracy, is left untouched by standard economic theory but not by Coasian logic.
After the debacle of textbook Keynesian (see Samuelson, 1951) notions of redistributing income on the basis of an estimated marginal propensity to consume being less than the average propensity to consume, which Friedman (1957) debunked as a basis for redistribution theory, the only traditional concept that this Coasian type of redistribution coexists with is Marshall's (1949, pp. 80-1) notion of differing marginal utilities of dollars of income. But Coasian transactions costs again make the difference. With zero transactions costs, a different marginal utility of income would imply that the income could simply be taken from home owners and given to children or their parents. Seamlessly the education goals would be met. Voucher plans aside, the problem is that the children generally cannot costlessly transform this money into education because there may be no suitable neighborhood place for the children to transform the dollars into education. Nor may they or their parents be so inclined. Yet just as a democracy can restrict child abuse, so can a democracy require education and mandate a certain spending level on schools. This Coasian-derived logic of redistribution differs from Marshallian marginal utility analysis of redistribution only in that the lack of costless markets can make the Marshallian analysis a special case that does not apply.
Again the financing of such redistributions by distorting taxes would optimally occur in Ramsey fashion; the inefficiencies of the taxes would be part of the society's cost calculation. Further, the Ramsey-type financing would optimally be in equilibrium with the Ramsey financing by the state in its other Coasian-derived role of lowering transactions costs.
Note that at times the combination of the two Coasian-derived roles of the state would occur naturally. For example the public education financed by property taxes might's lower the Beckerian (1971) wedge in wages due to discrimination, because of a more educated society; this would thereby decrease a distortion, lower the costs of exchange in labor markets, and increase their efficiency and again increase exchange.
Finally consider that the transactions cost of exchange gradually rises over time. To see this and its significance, Coase, Smith, and Stigler combine to give a possibly surprising dynamic result on the role of the state over time. First recall Coase's (1988) other most famous work``The nature of the firm''.
Paraphrasing the concept of the``Firm'' paper, the particular transactions cost amongst laborers, amongst managers, between labor and management, and amongst management, entrepreneurs, and owners, determine the particular structure, or``nature'', of the firm.
The second link which George Stigler (1968) helped make prominent is Adam Smith's axiom that the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market. Combining the transactions-cost-determined structure of the firm, with Smith's``extent of the market'', now consider the addition into the mixture of several centuries of gradual economic growth. What comes out is a theory of the secular growth of government. In particular, as secular economic growth has occurred, the markets have gradually extended in scope and depth, and the division of labor has increased towards greater specialization. For Marshall's (1949) ``representative'' or``average'' firm[1], the specialization means that firms have been able to afford increasingly more workers doing a similar set of functions, but each one doing a narrower task better. As a result, the growing specialization implies that increasingly complex webs of transactions costs amongst people define the structure of the average firm, and hence the average industry and market. And secular economic growth means that the web of transactions costs continues to become more complex.
These deductions based on the premises of Coase's theory of firm structure and Smith's theory of market scope and specialization provide the necessary foundation to explain the secular growth of the government as a``corporate form'' with the role to lower transactions costs and redistribute property rights. This secular growth would be in both of the two above roles. While the former type of growth in lowering rising transactions costs seems simple intuitively, the latter may seem less intuitive. To see that this secular growth also includes the redistribution role, consider the concept that Lucas (1992) puts forth. In trying to determine the distribution of income in a Friedman (1957)-type consumer society, with stochastic preference shocks, Lucas finds in the incentive-compatible, efficient, equilibrium an increasing inequality of income distribution. Although using only temporary rather than permanent shocks, this presents what is in a sense a more general case of heterogeneous, permanent income, consumers as compared to Friedman's single representative consumer. A growing inequality of income is consistent with a growing specialization of labor and so is consistent with Smith's dictum.
More in line with Coase, also consider the increasingly complex web of transactions costs that comprise the household. Aristotle's (1962) discussion of the growing division of labor in the household over time, combined with applying Coase's theory of the nature of the firm as a unique set of transactions costs to the nature of the household as a unique set of transactions costs, implies that the household's transactions costs also become secularly increasingly complex. Indeed, note how``communication gap'' seems to grow as children learn increasingly more in specialist education facilities as a substitute for accumulating human capital in the home. As education institutions continue to become greater specialists, the degree to which children substitute institutional The rising transactions costs in the household may be not only consistent with but also may be compounded by a rising inequality of income. Children who accumulate human capital in the educational market generally interact more with other children than they do when they accumulate human capital in the household. If learning by observing others, as Arrow (1994) suggests, plays an important role in human capital accumulation, then the inequalities of income as exhibited through students' outward manifestations such as food, clothing, and transportation habits, may create resentment. Moreover if, as Becker (1975) illustrates, past human capital accumulations can facilitate the job of adding further to human capital stocks through greater education, then students with less physical and human capital may be disadvantaged, may realize their disadvantage, and may resent others for their own disadvantage which is of a purely relative nature. Thus a growing inequality of income could add transactions costs to the existing set of transactions costs that already are rising because of growing specialization in the household.
If in fact income does tend towards growing inequality, for example sincè`N oah's children'' as Lucas illustrates, if transactions costs result from social discomfort, or learning problems, that stem from inequality, and if the social discomfort rises with the rising inequality, then the transactions costs rise with rising inequality. Now, in addition to arguing how the hypothetical roles of the state rise secularly, the feedback between lowering transactions costs and redistributing property rights given the transactions costs can be set out in the secular case. Because the transactions costs may result from the inequality itself, then a growing redistribution role may help to keep the transactions costs from rising as fast. The above example of redistributing physical capital to create human capital, which in turn lowers the wedge of discrimination, illustrates a redistributing role that also lowers transactions costs, and a role that seemingly would grow in scope over time should income become increasingly unequal in distribution. However note that a growing absolute size of the government is consistent with a decreasing size of the government factor cost relative to the total national factor cost [2] .
Implicit in the government role described herein is that concept that this government function would efficiently achieve``equilibrium''. This equilibrium, which seems to coincide with the more general equilibrium that Coase (1992) suggests in his Nobel lecture, includes the standard economic equilibrium as an integral subpart, or even special case, and unavoidably takes on the characteristic derived from Smith's trilogy: one formed generally as a result of social and political forces that determine a set of transactions costs which in turn shape economic forces.
Notes
1. See Marshall, (1949) , pp. 380-1, 265. 2. I owe this point to Milton Friedman.
